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Comments
PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
BROKERS AND INVESTORS: THE EXTENSION OF
WILKO TO SECTION 10(b) CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
A broker and an investor sign a customer agreement. The
agreement includes a clause requiring arbitration in the event the
investor should have any dispute with the broker. A dispute does in
fact arise, and the investor seeks to bring an antifraud action against
the broker in federal court under section 10(b)' of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act or 1934 Act).2 The broker
moves for a stay3 and an order to compel arbitration4 under the
Federal Arbitration Act.5 The investor responds that the Exchange
Act provides a right to a judicial forum6 that cannot be waived 7 by
any stipulation and that this precludes enforcement of the arbitra-
tion agreement. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari
to decide this conflict.8
In Wilko v. Swan 9 the Court held that predispute arbitration
agreements were unenforceable when an investor brought a claim
under section 12(2) 1 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act or
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
2. Id. at §§ 78a-78kk.
3. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
4. Id. at § 4.
5. Id. at §§ 1-14.
6. 15 U.S.C. at § 78aa.
7. Id. at § 78cc(a).
8. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986). The case also raises the issue of the arbitrability of RICO
claims. This comment does not address that question.
9. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
10. Section 12 (b) provides:
Any person who:
(2) offers or sells a security . . . by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
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1933 Act)." The Court found that the Act's provision of a judicial
forum 2 was subject to the protection of the Act's nonwaiver provi-
sion.'" The Court's analysis focused on Congress' intent to protect
investors through a process involving judicial expertise and review,
along with the provision of certain procedural advantages.' 4 Subse-
quently, federal courts read Wilko to preclude arbitration when
claims were brought under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The
courts based this extension on the common policy of the two securi-
ties acts and the identity of their nonwaiver provisions.' 5
In recent years, two arguments have been raised against the ap-
plication of Wilko to section 10(b) claims. First,Justice Stewart, writ-
ing for the majority in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,6 stated in dictum
that a "colorable argument" could be made against extending Wilko
because of differences between the jurisdictional and the protective
provisions of the two acts. The argument was uniformly rejected by
the federal appellate courts.' 7 Recently, however, Justice White, in
his concurrence in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 8 revived this
argument. Though the courts have generally rejected it again, the
argument was adopted by the Eighth Circuit.' 9 The second argu-
ment against extending Wilko asserts that improvements in the qual-
ity of the arbitration process, together with a renewed emphasis in
recent Supreme Court decisions favoring arbitration, make the arbi-
tral a satisfactory forum for resolving securities law disputes. 20 If
accepted, this second argument would not merely preclude exten-
sion of the Wilko holding to Exchange Act claims, but overrule Wilko
altogether.
This comment will examine the Wilko case in detail and deter-
mine whether its premises and reasoning apply with equal force to
the protective and jurisdictional provisions of both securities acts.
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction ....
15 U.S.C. § 77() (1982).
11. Id. at §§ 77a-77mm.
12. Id. at § 77v(a).
13. Id. at § 77n.
14. See infra Section II.B.
15. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
16. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
17. See infra note 92.
18. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
19. Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 86-578). The First Circuit
has also held for arbitrability. Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc.,
806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986).
20. See infra Section V.
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The argument raised by Justices Stewart and White will be read in
light of Wilko, judicial and legislative history, and the standards of
language analysis that the Court applied in previous decisions in-
volving the Exchange Act. Finally, there will be a reevaluation of
the arbitration process through the lens of recent Court instruction
on reading the Arbitration Act.
II. PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THE 1933 AND
1934 SECURITIES ACTS: WILKO AND SCHERK
A. Overview of the Securities and Federal Arbitration Acts
1. The Securities Acts.-In direct response to the market crash of
1929 Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Congress had recognized the hazards of an
unequal bargaining position between those in the industry and in-
vestors. 2' Through full and fair disclosure requirements and the
threat of civil and criminal liability, the Securities Act, aimed princi-
pally at the issuance of securities, manifested the congressional in-
tent to rectify this dangerous imbalance.22 The 1934 Act, as an
extension of the 1933 Act, promoted the same policy of investor
protection by requiring disclosure and providing penalties for non-
disclosure to those dealing in secondary markets, exchanges, and
over-the-counter markets.23
2. Federal Arbitration Act.-In the face of historic judicial antipa-
thy to arbitration 24 Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in
1925.25 This Act "established a new policy declaring the validity,
irrevocability and enforceability of any contractual agreement sub-
mitting future disputes to arbitration. '26 This "new policy" reaf-
firmed an underlying policy of controlling the expense and
complexity of dispute resolution. 27 The Act provided that a party to
an arbitration agreement could seek a stay of federal court action
pending arbitration 8 as well as an order to compel arbitration.
21. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). See also infra Section V.
22. See, e.g., Note, Mixed Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Claims in Securities Litigation: Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 34 CATii. U.L. REV. 525, 531-34 (1985).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 528-29 & n.25.
25. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
26. Note, supra note 22, at 530.
27. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
28. 9 U.S.C. at § 3.
29. Id. at § 4.
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B. Wilko v. Swan: A Judicial Forum Cannot Be Waived
Under the 1933 Act
1. Overview.-In 1953 the Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan 31
faced the issue of whether an arbitration clause 3' in a margin ac-
count agreement between an investor and a broker was enforceable
under section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. 32 The investor
brought the underlying claim under section 12(2) of the Securities
Act, one of the Act's antifraud provisions.3 3 He signed the agree-
ment prior to any alleged violation and before any dispute had
arisen.3 4 The investor asserted that the broker had induced him to
buy shares of a certain stock based on false representations of an
upcoming merger.15 The plaintiff was lead to believe the value of
the stock would rise $6.00 a share.36 Two weeks later the stock was
sold at a loss. 3 7 The district court denied the broker's motion for a
stay pending arbitration;38 the court of appeals reversed.39
The issue in Wilko was whether section 14 of the 1933 Act, 40 the
30. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
31. The arbitration clause read as follows:
"Any controversy arising between us under this contract shall be determined by
arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Law of the State of New York, and
under the rules of either the Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of Com-
merce of the State of New York or of the American Arbitration Association, or
of the Arbitration Committee of the New York Stock Exchange or such other
Exchange as may have jurisdiction over the matter in dispute ....
Id. at 432 n. 15.
The clause is fairly typical. But see Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15 n.7, Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986) [hereinafter SEC Brief] (contending
that after 1975 the SEC's oversight authority makes the arbitration agreement at issue in
Wilko an anachronism). See infra notes 119, 192, 276, and accompanying text. Cf Letter
from John D. Dingell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
of the Committee on Energy and Commerce toJohn S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securit-
ites and Exchange Commission (Feb. 11, 1987) (questioning SEC's recent reversal in
favor of arbitrability and suggesting possible congressional inquiry into securities indus-
try arbitration process).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
33. For the text of § 12(2), see supra note 10; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29.
34. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435. The Court considered this fact essential. This comment
discusses only arbitration clauses entered into prior to any alleged violation.
35. Id. at 428-29.
36. Id. at 429.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 430.
39. Id.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). This section reads as follows: "Any condition, stipula-
tion, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of this title or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be
void."
342 [VOL. 46:339
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Act's nonwaiver provision, precluded enforcement of the arbitration
agreement. Section 14 voids "any stipulation" waiving compliance
with "any provision" of the Securities Act. The arbitration agree-
ment at issue here was a stipulation. The crux of the case centered
on construction of the "any provision" language and on determin-
ing whether Congress intended the Act's provision of a judicial fo-
rum to be nonwaivable under section 14.4'
Strictly speaking, the provision at issue in Wilko was not the pro-
tective provision, section 12(2). The Court, however, made clear
that section 12(2)'s standards would govern whether the matter
would be addressed in an arbitral or a judicial forum.42 The provi-
sion in question was section 22(a)43 of the 1933 Act, the jurisdic-
tional provision, that creates concurrent federal and state
jurisdiction for all 1933 Act claims. The Court held that the right to
have a section 12(2) Securities Act claim heard in a judicial forum
was the kind of right Congress intended section 14 to protect.
44
Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, began his analysis by
addressing the origins of and the purposes behind the Securities
Act. 45 In response to the market crash of 1929, Congress had re-
sponded with a legislative scheme designed to protect investors
through a policy of full and fair disclosure.4 6 Section 12(2) of the
Act was created by Congress "to effectuate this policy."' 47 The
Court stated that section 12(2) created a "special right" for the in-
vestor because the seller is made to assume the burden of proving
41. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
42. "We agree that in so far as the award in arbitration may be affected by legal
requirements, statutes or common law, rather than by considerations of fairness, the
provisions of the Securities Act control." Id. at 433-34.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982). This section reads as follows:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any
Territory .... shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this sub-
chapter and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission
in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this subchapter. Any such suit or action may be brought in the district wherein
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the dis-
trict where the offer or sale took place, if the defendant participated therein,
and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the de-
fendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found .... No case
arising under this title and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction
shall be removed to any court of the United States ....
44. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
45. Id. at 430-31.
46. Id. at 431.
47. Id.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
lack of scienter.48 This right was special because it shifted the burden
of proof as usually found at common law.49 The Court then tied
effectuation of this special right to the procedural guarantees of sec-
tion 22(a). First, the right was enforceable in a state or federal fo-
rum, with removal from the state forum forbidden. Second, when a
federal court is chosen, the plaintiff had a wide choice of venue and
nationwide service of process, and was not subject to the usual di-
versity and jurisdictional amount requirements. 50
Next, the Court looked briefly to the congressional policy be-
hind the Federal Arbitration Act.5 ' Congress saw arbitration as a
desirable alternative to complex litigation. It avoided delay and ex-
pense.52 Moreover, it was intended to apply to controversies based
on both statutes and standards otherwise created.53 However,
"[t]his hospitable attitude [of Congress] ... toward arbitration [did]
not solve [the Court's] question as to the validity of [the] stipulation
... to submit [the securities claim] to arbitration .... 54
2. The Court's Analysis.-The Wilko Court held that "an ar-
rangement to arbitrate [was] a [section 14] 'stipulation' and [that]
the right to select the judicial forum [under section 22(a) was] the
kind of 'provision' that [could not] be waived under § 14 of the Se-
curities Act." '55 This holding had two cornerstones: first, an analy-
sis of policy and statute; second, an analysis of the difference
between adjudication and arbitration.
The Court accepted the investor's argument that Congress in-
tended the nonwaiver provision of section 14 "to assure that sellers
could not maneuver buyers into a position that might weaken their
ability to recover under the Securities Act."5 6
[T]he Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disad-
vantages under which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers
in securities have better opportunities to investigate and
appraise the prospective earnings and business plans af-




51. Id. at 431-32. It is interesting to note the order in which the two acts are ad-
dressed. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), it is the policy behind
the Arbitration Act that is first addressed.
52. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-32.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 432.
55. Id. at 434-35.
56. Id. at 432.
344 [VOL. 46:339
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for Congress to put buyers of securities covered by that Act
on a different basis from other purchasers.
57
This "different basis" prevented securities purchasers from be-
ing subject to arbitration clauses. Such arbitration clauses, when
signed "prior to any violation of the Securities Act," represented
the kind of maneuvering that Congress created section 14 to pre-
vent. The investor who signed an arbitration agreement gave up the
protective rights that Congress provided-for example, the wide
choice of courts and venue. Further, the investor gave up these
rights "at a time [prior to the violation,] when he [was] less able to
judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act place[d] upon
his adversary." '58
Equally significant was the Court's acceptance of the investor's
argument that "arbitration lacks the certainty of a suit at law under
the Act to enforce [an investor's] rights." 59 Arbitration could not
apply the securities laws as effectively as a judicial proceeding.60
The Court indicated by example6 that arbitration was more suited
to issues that were objectively measurable. The Court had serious
doubts about the viability of arbitration when a "case require[d]
subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged vio-
lator of the [Securities] Act." 62
The Court then raised a series of objections to the suitability of
the arbitration process for resolving claims under the securities
laws. Initially, the Court found that arbitrators may make legal de-
terminations and apply them "without judicial instruction on the
law." 6 Further, an arbitration "award may be made without expla-
nation of [the arbitrators'] reasons and without a complete record of
their proceedings, [or] the arbitrators' conception of the legal
meaning of [the specially designed] statutory requirements. -61
Most importantly, there is no judicial review for error in interpret-
ing the law.65 In addition, the "[p]ower to vacate an award is lim-
57. Id. at 435.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 432.
60. Id. at 435.
61. The issues to be decided were not like determining the "quality of a commodity
or the amount of money due under a contract .... Id.
62. Id. at 435-36.
63. Id. at 436.
64. Id. An arbitrator or self-regulatory organization (SRO), in light of the Uniform
Arbitration Code, may choose to create "some sort of record." See Katsoris, The Arbitra-
tion of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 286 n.47 (1984).
65. Wilho, 346 U.S. at 436.
1987]
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ited" to egregious circumstances.66 Without a record to determine
any such abuses, it will be impossible to vacate an award for failure
to decide "in accordance with the provisions of the Securities
Act."' 67 The Court concluded: "As the protective provisions of the
Securities Act require the exercise of judicial discretion to fairly as-
sure their effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress must have in-
tended § 14 . .. to apply to waiver of judicial trial and review. "68
Thus, the Court found that the right to choose a judicial forum
was necessary to maintain and effect the rights that Congress pro-
vided in the protective provisions of the Act. As such, the right to a
judicial forum was an independent right of substantive signifi-
cance.6' Though such a conclusion was not easily reconcilable with
the policy behind the Federal Arbitration Act, "the intention of
Congress concerning the sale of securities [was] better carried out
by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of [predispute
violations] arising under the Act." 7
C. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.: The "Colorable Argument"
1. Overview.-After Wilko, federal courts generally accepted
the view that Wilko's logic was equally applicable to claims brought
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.7 However, in Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.72 a majority of the Supreme Court raised a doubt about
this applicability in what appeared an obvious parallel between the
policies of the two acts and the relevant provisions at issue.
Scherk centered around a business transaction between an
American corporate purchaser and a German seller. The transac-
tion involved the sale of three enterprises, organized under the laws
of Germany and Liechtenstein, along with the purchase of certain
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 437.
69. Id. at 437-38 (citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263
(1949), in which forum selection was considered a " 'substantial right' ").
70. Id. at 438.
71. See, e.g., Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d Cir.
1970) (citing Wilko):
This type of question concerning . the meaning of Rule lOb-5 is properly
litigated in the courts where a complete record is kept of the proceedings and
findings and conclusions are made. It was for that reason that in both the 1933
and 1934 securities acts Congress provided that questions arising under those
acts were not to be determined in arbitration proceedings (but rather in the
courts) even if the contract between the parties contained an arbitration
provision.
72. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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trademarks. 7' The issue of fraud centered on whether or not the
trademarks were encumbered.74 The contract was negotiated in the
United States, England, and Germany, signed in Austria, and closed
in Switzerland.75 The contract included an agreement to refer any
controversy or claim to arbitration before the International Cham-
ber of Commerce in Paris under the law of Illinois.76
The American plaintiff brought suit in a United States district
court under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 7 The district and appel-
late courts, following Wilko, denied Scherk's motion to stay litigation
pending arbitration. 78 The Supreme Court reversed and held the
agreement arbitrable. v9
The Court based its holding entirely on the "truly interna-
tional" nature of the agreement.80 The Court viewed the arbitration
agreement in the contract as a problem of "international conflict-of-
laws" rather than domestic securities law.8" The arbitration clause
was taken as a "specialized kind of forum selection" that permitted
an orderly choice of situs and procedures to resolve the dispute.8 2
The Court found such a choice essential to avoid chaos and provide
the predictability required by the international business commu-
nity.83 Thus, Wilko was distinguished since it involved a completely
domestic dispute.8 4 In essence, the Court refused to take a "paro-
chial" attitude towards international business transactions.8 5
2. The Colorable Argument.-The holding in Scherk was based en-
tirely on the international nature of the transaction. However, in
73. Id. at 508.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 508-09.
76. Id. at 508.
77. Id. at 509.
78. Id. at 510.
79. The majority may have simply found it unthinkable to bring an action of such
international dimension into federal court after Alberto-Culver had agreed to arbitra-
tion before the international community. Cf Gruenbaum, Avoiding the Protection of the
Federal Securities Laws: The Antiwaiver Provisions, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 58 n.48
(1980) (arguing that the Court doubted from the outset that section 10(b) even applied).
80. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
81. Id. at 516.
82. Id. at 519.
83. Id. at 516.
84. Id. at 515.
85. Id. at 516-17, 519. Wilko was further distinguished on the ground that the loss of
the Securities Act's procedural advantages, central in the wholly domestic context of
Wilko, was "chimerical" in the context of an international transaction, since the defend-




dictum, Justice Stewart stated that "a colorable argument could be
made that even the semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does
not control the case before us."'8 6 This argument consisted of a
number of subparts:
(1) There was no express statutory counterpart to section
12(2) in the 1934 Act. 7
(2) "[N]either § 10(b) nor rule 10(b)-5 speaks of a private
remedy to redress violations of the kind alleged here."8 8
(3) Though courts had recognized a section 10(b) private
right of action, "the [Exchange Act] itself does not establish the
'special right' that the Court in Wilko found significant."8s9
(4) The jurisdictional provision of the 1933 Act, section 22(a),
provided for concurrent state and federal forums, whereas the par-
allel section of the 1934 Act, section 27, provided for exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction. 90  Justice Stewart stated that this contrast
demonstrated a more restricted jurisdiction.9
3. Positions Rejecting the Colorable Argument After Scherk.-The col-
orable argument was uniformly rejected by post-Scherk federal ap-
pellate courts deciding the issue of the arbitrability of section 10(b)
claims.92 First, some of these courts recognized the argument as
mere dictum. They focused on the fact that the Scherk Court's hold-
86. Id. at 513. At the time, "colorable" was defined as "seemingly valid, genuine;
plausible; having an appearance of truth, right, or justice; also, counterfeit or feigned.
Syn: See SPECIOUS." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 529 (2d ed. 1959).
87. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513.
88. Id. Rule lOb-5 is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1986).
89. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982). This section reads as follows:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder .... Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created
by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder ... may be brought in any
such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant
or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other
district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may
be found ....
91. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513.
92. See, e.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59, 61
(8th Cir. 1984); First Heritage Corp. v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 710 F.2d 1205, 1207
(6th Cir. 1983); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023,
1025-26 (11 th Cir. 1982); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030
(6th Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823,
827-29 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558
F.2d 831, 835-36 (7th Cir. 1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
538 F.2d 532, 536-37 & n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
348 [VOL. 46:339
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ing made the international aspects of that case entirely dispositive.9 3
Thus, Scherk itself was not considered applicable in a wholly domes-
tic context. 4
Second, courts rejected the argument on its merits. Most sig-
nificant in their analysis was the fundamental consideration given to
the policy behind both securities acts. For instance, in Weissbuch v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.95 the Seventh Circuit held
that "policy considerations mandate the application of Wilko to Rule
lOb-5 situations absent the presence of international concerns. ' '96
That court found Wilko's analysis wholly adaptable to section 10(b)
claims because of the "overriding concern for the protection of
investors." 97
This policy of investor protection is the common source of both
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.98 In Wilko the Court un-
derstood the Securities Act to manifest this policy through an inter-
active system of provisions. The Securities Act gives investors
remedies through its protective provisions, and also gives the proce-
dural means, such as a judicial forum, to adequately effect those
remedies.99 The basic design of the Exchange Act is no different.
Thus, when comparing section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, the Tenth Circuit found "it is necessary to
recognize that the policy considerations in the two instances with
respect to the two remedies [section 12(2) and section 10(b)] are not
different." ' That court found that the purpose of rule 10(b)-5 was
to protect the vulnerable purchaser from the more sophisticated
seller.' Further, the court added that "the parallel considerations
of the two Acts make it impossible to draw . . . a distinction.''102
Inexplicably, the Scherk majority never addressed the issue of inves-
tor protection in its "colorable argument."
In turn, the federal courts did not directly address the specific
distinctions between section 12(2) and section 10(b) put forward by
Justice Stewart. The questions of whether section 10(b) is a "special
93. See, e.g., Weissbuch, 558 F.2d at 835-36.
94. See, e.g., Moore, 590 F.2d at 827-28 (finding considerations and policies in Scherk
significantly different from those found controlling in Wilko).
95. 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
96. Id. at 835.
97. Id. at 836.
98. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
99. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
100. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827 (10th
Cir. 1978).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 826.
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right" equivalent to section 12(2) and whether an implied remedy is
somehow inferior to an explicit private remedy were not considered.
Resting on the potency of the common policy and purposes of the
two securities acts, and their statutory parallels, these courts were
"not . . . persuaded that either the differences between the rights
granted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts or any consideration of policy
warrant.. . a distinction."' t0 3 Even with a superior rationale for de-
nying the arbitrability of section 10(b) claims, these courts failed to
root out the "colorable" seeds ofJustice Stewart's argument. Thus,
the "colorable argument" has sprouted again, and the need to ad-
dress the distinctions raised in Scherk, along with policy issues, is
now mandated. 1
04
The parallels and distinctions between the jurisdictional provi-
sions were addressed more thoroughly in other opinions, notably by
Justice Douglas in his Scherk dissent. Just as with a section 12(2)
action brought in an arbitral, there would be " 'subjective findings
on the purpose and knowledge' of the defendant, questions ill-de-
termined by arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law."'105
There would be no development of a record, nor any judicial re-
view. 10 6 Moreover, "It]he extensive pretrial discovery provided by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. .. would not be available ....
[Nor would] the wide choice of venue provided by [section 27].' '1 °7
Justice Douglas concluded that the "loss of the proper judicial fo-
rum carries with it the loss of substantial rights."'0 8 Thus, the loss
of an exclusive federal forum would be the loss of a "substantial
right," as the loss of concurrent jurisdiction was held to be in
Wilko.' 
0 9
103. Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976), quoted in Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 836 (7th Cir. 1977); see Moore, 590 F.2d at 828.
104. See infra Sections III and IV.
105. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953)).
106. Id.
107. Id. The Ninth Circuit adduced other lost advantages: the right to a federal fo-
rum without a need to meet diversity or jurisdictional amount requirements; nationwide
service of process provided by section 27 of the 1934 Act; and the venue provisions of
section 27, which in fact provide the plaintiff with a wider choice than the venue provi-
sions of section 22(a) of the 1933 Act. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 794 F.2d
520, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1986).
108. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 532 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See the discussion of exclusive
jurisdiction, infra Section III.B.4.
109. "These are the policy considerations which underlay Wilko and which apply to
the instant case as well." Scherk, 417 U.S. at 532 n.l 1 (Douglas,J., dissenting). See Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953) (citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 338
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The "colorable argument" raised no question about the practi-
cal identity of the two acts' nonwaiver provisions. As the appellate
court decisions made clear, section 29(a) of the 1934 Act and sec-
tion 14 of the 1933 Act were virtually identical." In some post-
Scherk decisions this particular equivalence, combined with policy
considerations, was virtually dispositive. " '
In addition to the federal courts' agreement that Wilko should
be extended to section 10(b) claims, the Third Circuit, in Ayres v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.," 2 asserted that Congress
had apparently accepted this position as well.' In 1975, Congress
made significant revisions in the securities laws."' Section 28(b)' '5
was developed to permit an exception to the rule of nonwaiver of a
judicial forum by participants in self-regulatory organizations who
enter arbitration agreements among themselves. The conference
committee report on this amendment stated that "[i]t was the clear
understanding of the conferees that this amendment did not change
existing law as articulated in Wilko ... concerning the effect of arbi-
tration proceeding provisions of agreements entered into by
[nonindustry] persons dealing with members and participants of
U.S. 263 (1949), which indicated that loss of a right to select ajudicial forum was a loss
of a substantial right).
110. See, e.g., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831,
836 (7th Cir. 1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532,
536 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976). Cf Sibley v. Tandey Corp., 543 F.2d
540, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976) (adhering to the view that the similarities between the two
acts far outweigh any differences that might exist), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
Section 14 states:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any se-
curity to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules
and regulations of the Commission shall be void.
15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
Section 29(a) states:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder,
or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982).
111. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29
(10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch, 558 F.2d at 835-36.
112. 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
113. Id. at 536-37.
114. The 1975 amendments were the "most substantial and significant revision of this
country's federal securities laws since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." Securities Acts Amendments of 1975: Hearings on S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975)
[hereinafter Hearings]. See Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1037 (11 th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (quoting Hearings, supra). For a discussion of congressional reenact-
ment, see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982).
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self-regulatory organizations." ' 16
The Ayres court inferred that Congress would not have asserted
the continuing vitality of Wilko in a revision of the 1934 Act unless it
applied to Exchange Act claims." 7 The Seventh Circuit adopted
the Ayres court analysis."'
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had also taken
a stand in favor of extending Wilko to section 10(b) claims." 9 In
adopting rule 15c2-212 0 the SEC recognized that the Wilko doctrine
applied to all the federal securities laws. 12  Rule 15c2-2 prohibits
116. H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 321, 342.
117. Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1205 (3d
Cir.) (Adams,J., concurring), petitionfor cert.filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 25, 1986)
(No. 86-487). This argument was rejected in Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1398 n.17 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3296
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 86-578), and was considered less than certain by Judge Adams
in Jacobson.
118. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 836 (7th
Cir. 1977).
119. The SEC recently reversed its position and now contends that arbitration agree-
ments that refer to the rules of securities associations or exchanges, subject to SEC over-
sight, are enforceable. See generally SEC Brief, supra note 31.
120. Rule 15c 2-2 provides:
It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a broker
or dealer to enter into an agreement with any public customer which purports
to bind the customer to the arbitration of future disputes between them arising
under the Federal securities laws, or to have in effect such an agreement, pursu-
ant to which it effects transactions with or for a customer.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1986).
Upon being "informed that the Commission had submitted an amicus curiae brief on
the side of the securities industry rather than investors," Rep. Dingell, as Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, requested that the SEC provide the Subcommittee with documentation re-
lating to the SEC's previous position against arbitration and its recent change in favor of
arbitration. Letter from John D. Dingell, supra note 31, at 2. The tone of the letter
indicates that the Subcommittee will require a well-founded basis for the SEC's dramatic
reversal. Chairman Dingell specifically reminded Chairman Shad that "time and time
again, the Commission has advised the Committee of serious limitations on your author-
ity and in the arbitration process itself," id. at 3 (emphasis in original), e.g.., in an August
1986 Commission report issued only three months before the Commission's reversal in
McMahon, id.
Most significantly, the letter also suggests that Congress intends to look into "legis-
lative or regulatory changes . . . appropriate to improve the arbitration process and
[SEC] oversight thereof." Id. This evidences a general concern that the congressional
purpose behind the securities laws, investor protection, is the continuing preeminent
concern of Congress. In light of the critical importance of congressional intent in decid-
ing the arbitrability issue, and congressional doubts concerning SEC oversight and the
arbitration process itself, id. at 3, action in favor of the arbitrability of § 10(b) claims or
in overturning Wilko remains highly questionable.
121. But cf. Shotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp. 516, 526-27 (D. Md. 1986) (stating that rule
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brokers from using predispute arbitration clauses in agreements
with customers that purport to bind investors to arbitration when
"Federal securities law" claims are at issue.' 2 The Commission, in
its discussion of rule 15c2-2's final adoption, made clear that "Fed-
eral securities law" included the 1934 Act and section 10(b).' 23
Quoting the Sixth Circuit as exemplary, the Commission stated
" '[c]ourts have consistently held that Wilko's [sic] holding and ra-
tionale [under the Securities Act of 1933] are equally applicable to
cases arising under the 1934 Act.' ",124 The Commission, respond-
ing to industry criticism, noted that there was no authoritative "ba-
sis upon which the Commission [could] determine that the Wilko
analysis [did] not hold equally true for other federal securities acts,
which contain[ed] substantially identical anti-waiver provisions."' 125
The parallel policy needs and purposes of the two acts, appar-
ent congressional and clear SEC extension of Wilko, and the superfi-
cial distinctions made by the "colorable argument" should have
finished that argument. However, the Court's continuing focus on
limiting its analysis of congressional intent primarily to statutory
language ("semantic reasoning," as Justice Stewart called it), and
the Court's recent endorsement of the policy behind the Arbitration
Act, have recalled the colorable argument from the brink. Justice
White took the step of resurrecting the argument, 2 6 and the First
and Eighth Circuits have given it the force of precedent.' 27 As long
as Wilko remains the law, however, this argument cannot stand.
15c2-2 is merely a procedural device that provides notice and does not act
substantively).
122. See supra note 120.
123. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404 (1983).
124. Id. (quoting First Heritage Corp. v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 710 F.2d 1205, 1207
(6th Cir. 1983)).
125. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404 n.6 (1983).
126. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
127. In Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st
Cir. 1986), the First Circuit held predispute arbitration agreements enforceable when
plaintiffs raise section 10(b) claims. The Page court was "persuaded by the result
reached by the Eighth Circuit, although for somewhat different reasons .... " Id. at 295.
The court made only limited use of the colorable argument, id. at 296, focusing primar-
ily on recent Supreme Court instruction concerning the Arbitration Act, id. at 296-98.
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit wholly adopted the colorable argument, see Phillips v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1395-98 (8th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 86-578), and included only brief,
general statements on the policy favoring arbitration, id. at 1395, 1398.
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III. JUSTICE WHITE AND A RE-EXAMINATION OF
THE COLORABLE ARGUMENT
This section will review Justice White's restatement of the col-
orable argument and its adoption by the Eighth Circuit panel in
Phillips. It will then address each objection to the nonarbitrability of
section 10(b) claims. Included in the overall analysis will be certain
analyses of the Second,' 2s Third, 29 Ninth,' ° and Eleventh' 3' Cir-
cuits in recent opinions upholding the application of Wilko to the
1934 Act. In the end, the only legitimate question remaining will be
whether arbitration procedures, the quality of the arbitrators, and
the overall fairness of the arbitration process have improved suffi-
ciently in the last thirty-three years to remove a need for the "judi-
cial direction" that the Wilko Court understood as necessary for
giving full effect to the protective provisions of the securities acts
created by Congress. 3 2
A. Restatement of the Colorable Argument
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd 13 3 the Supreme Court, in a
footnote, portrayed the state of the colorable argument. It noted
that Scherk raised doubts about the extension of Wilko to section
10(b) claims. It further noted, however, that the Scherk Court did
not hold that Wilko would not apply in the section 10(b) context. 134
The Byrd majority expressly recognized that numerous federal
courts have applied Wilko to section 10(b) claims and that agree-
ments to arbitrate such claims are unenforceable in these courts.
The Court chose not to resolve the issue since it was not properly
before the Court.' 35
In a concurring opinion, Justice White, who had dissented in
Scherk, essentially restated the Scherk majority's colorable argument.
First, he noted that the Wilko analysis centered around the intercon-
128. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
129. Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 25, 1986) (No. 86-487).
130. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1986) (No. 86-321).
131. Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032 (11 th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
132. See infra Section V.
133. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
134. Id. at 215 n.l.
135. The Court has now chosen to decide the issue. McMahon v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
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nection of sections 12(2), 14, and 22(a) of the 1933 Act.'" 6 He then
stated that the reasoning that upheld nonwaiver in Wilko could not
be "mechanically transplanted to the 1934 Act."' 37 The extent of
actual analysis is as follows:
(1) Justice White recognized that section 29(a) and section 14,
the nonwaiver provisions, were equivalent. He did not consider this
equivalence sufficient to counterbalance the lack of similarity he
found between sections 12(2) and 22(a) of the 1933 Act and sections
10(b) and 27 of the 1934 Act. 138
(2) The jurisdictional provisions of the two acts were distin-
guishable. Section 27 of the 1934 Act provided for exclusive juris-
diction in the federal courts,'3 9 whereas section 22(a) of the 1933
Act provided for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction.' 40 The
Scherk Court called this a significant restriction.' 4 ' Justice White
again characterized section 27 as "narrow.' '1 42
(3) "More importantly," the section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
claims were implied rather than express private causes of action.1 43
Justice White drew two conclusions from this premise.' 44 First,
"[t]he phrase 'waive compliance with any provision of this chapter',
[§ 29(a),] is ... literally inapplicable."' 145 Second, "Wilko's [sic] so-
licitude for the federal cause of action-the 'special right' estab-
lished by Congress . . . is not necessarily appropriate where the
cause of action is judicially implied and not so different from the
common law action." 146 Supplementing Justice White's position,
the Eighth Circuit recalled that it was the shift in the burden of
proof to the defendant that made section 12(2) special and distin-
guished it from the common-law remedy.' 47
(4) The Phillips court went one step beyond the colorable ar-
gument and added that it was the difference between the two acts in
conjunction with "the strong federal policy favoring enforcement of
arbitration agreements" that prohibited an extension of Wilko to the
136. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See supra note 90.
140. See supra note 43.
141. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 512, 514 (1974).
142. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 224-25 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983)).
144. The logical steps between premise and conclusion are absent.
145. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
146. Id.
147. Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1397-98
(8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 86-578).
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1934 Act. 14 8
B. Analysis of the Colorable Argument 149
1. The Parallels Between Section 29(a) of the 1934 Act and Section 14
of the 1933 Act. The Policy of Investor Protection.-Even the Eighth Cir-
cuit, ruling against nonwaiver, found the two nonwaiver sections vir-
tually identical.15 0 Yet it failed to look at the importance of this
parallel. This failure is difficult to understand in light of the pre-
Byrd decisions that found the similarity between the two sections a
strong ground for extending Wilko.' 5 '
As stated in Wilko, the nonwaiver provision "assure[d] that sell-
ers could not maneuver buyers into a position that might weaken
their ability to recover under the Securities Act."52 Thus, section
14 of the 1933 Act manifested Congress' policy of investor protec-
tion. This protection was especially important, in the broker-inves-
tor context, against those in the securities industry with superior
148. Id. at 1398. See infra Section IV.
149. As noted in Phillips, since Byrd a majority of the federal district courts addressing
the issue of arbitrability of section 10(b) claims have ruled in favor of arbitrability.
Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1396 n.8. Moreover, as one district court has noted, almost all of the
district court rulings for nonarbitrability have been based on a "finding that binding pre-
Byrd precedent on this issue exists in their circuit ...." Shotto v. Laub, 632 F. Supp.
516, 525 (D. Md. 1986). Since that time two circuit courts have reconsidered the
extension of Wilko, independent of precedent, and in thoroughgoing analyses have ruled
in favor of extension. Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. 800 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1986)
(en banc); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), petitionfor cert.
filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1986) (No. 86-321). As demonstrated by Shotto's
mechanical recitation of the colorable argument, district courts ruling in favor of
arbitrability are acting no differently from the courts that mechanically rely on
precedent, i.e., they are expressly holding that the colorable argument is correct without
any searching analysis as to why. See, e.g., Bob Ladd, Inc. v. Adcock, 633 F. Supp. 241,
242-43 (E.D. Ark. 1986); Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 26, 27-28 (W.D. Wash.
1985); Dees v. Distenfield, 618 F. Supp. 123, 125-26 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
These cases are not based solely on the White concurrence. They also rely equally,
as does Phillips, on the view that federal arbitration policy, in light of the improved
quality of arbitration procedures, overrides the federal securities law policy. The
differences adduced by Justice White merely act as a wedge to hold the door open for
this policy favoring arbitration. See, e.g., Brener, 628 F. Supp. at 448 (focusing on the
quality of arbitration procedures that now exist); Dees, 618 F. Supp. at 126 (focusing on
policy favoring arbitration and absence of indication from Congress that rule lOb-5
claims should not be arbitrated). The policy logic on which these cases hinge would not
only deny extension of Wilko, but reverse it altogether. See infra Section IV.
150. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1397.
151. This argument has recently been re-emphasized. See Conover, 794 F.2d at 523;
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.), cert. g'anted,
107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
152. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432.
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access to information. 53 This same policy and the same concerns
are at the heart of the 1934 Act. 154 The virtual identity of section
29(a) of the 1934 Act and section 14 of the 1933 Act assuredly
manifests an equal design to protect investors.
As the central provisions at issue in the arbitration cases, sec-
tions 29(a) and 14 set the boundaries for discussing the other issues.
The courts must confront the congressional purpose of investor
protection. Yet neither the Phillips panel nor Justice White ad-
dresses the policy of the Exchange Act in their arguments. They
subtly displace this policy by pointing to the difference between sec-
tions 12(2) and 10(b) and sections 22(a) and 27. This disregard of
the central policy in the securities acts, so highly respected in
Wilko,' 55 defies reason' 56 and recent instruction of the Court
itself. 157
2. Implied Remedy v. Express Remedy.-Justice White offers the
argument that since the private right of action under section 10(b) is
not expressly in the language of the statute, it "literally" is not a
provision of the 1934 Act-at least for purposes of the protection
offered by section 29(a).' This conclusion is the result of an
overly strict application of the Court's approach to statutory lan-
guage analysis.
153. Id. at 435.
154. "The Securities Act of 1933 was designed to provide investors with full disclo-
sure .... The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors ...... Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). "The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute
interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in se-
curities." Id. at 206. Section 10(b) itself states that "the Commission may prescribe
[rules and regulations] necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
155. As powerfully stated in the last sentence of Wilko: "Recognizing the advantages
that prior agreements for arbitration may provide for the solution of commercial contro-
versies, we decide that the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is
better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising
under the Act." 346 U.S. at 438.
156. In Scherk, the policy of investor protection was overcome by sufficient counter-
vailing grounds. In that case, the international dimension of the transactions, the choice
of law problem, and the need for predictability in the international business community
took that particular transaction and the agreement tied to it completely out of the "paro-
chial" sphere of American securities laws. In fact,Justice Stewart's developed analysis of
the crucial international elements stands in marked contrast to the "colorable
argument."
157. See infra Section V.
158. The First Circuit agrees with this aspect ofJustice White's argument. See Page v.
Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 296 (1st Cir. 1986). See
also supra note 127.
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In his concurrence in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 159
Justice Powell stated that "[t]he starting point in every case involv-
ing construction of a statute is the language itself."' 60 In Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder 161 Justice Powell, now writing for the majority,
reiterated this approach, and stated further that ascertainment of
congressional intent rested primarily on statutory language in the
case of both implied and express remedies. 162 Shortly thereafter, in
Santa Fe Industries v. Green 163 Justice White, speaking for the major-
ity, followed both of the above-stated precepts and essentially held
that the meaning of the language on the face of the statute set the
limits of its protections when no legislative history supported a de-
parture from that language."
In the above cases, the language logically read as the Court in-
terpreted it. In Hochfelder the Court had to ascertain the standard of
liability under section 10(b). The relevant statutory language for-
bade the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance .... " 165 Justice Powell began his analysis of this language by
stating that "[t]he words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in con-
junction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b)
was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional conduct."' 16 6 He
rejected the SEC's argument for a negligence standard because it
"simply ignore[d] the use of the words 'manipulative,' 'deceptive,'
159. 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 756.
161. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
162. Id. at 200.
163. 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that section 10(b) requires deception or misrepre-
sentation and that a breach of fiduciary duty alone is not subject to section 10(b)'s
protections).
164. Id. at 473. Justice White added that even if the language of the statute was not
'sufficiently clear in its context,' " additional considerations would weigh heavily.
Thus, the Court also looked (1) to the usefulness of the remedy sought in light of con-
gressional policy, and (2) to the interrelation of state and federal law. Id. at 477-79.
165. Section 10(b) states:
[It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange-]
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
166. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197 (citing, e.g., Loss, Summary Remarks, 30 Bus. LAw 163,
165 (Mar. 1975) ("Since when is negligent conduct 'manipulative' or 'deceptive'? We
are dealing, after all, with the English language.")).
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and 'contrivance' ...."7
Justice Powell noted the dictionary definition of these terms in
showing an "unmistakable .. .congressional intent to proscribe a
type of conduct quite different from negligence."'' 6 8 He looked ad-
ditionally to the specialized application of the term "manipulative"
which "was virtually a term of art when used in connection with securi-
ties markets."'' 69 The statutory language "connote[d] intentional or
willful conduct"'170 in light of its common and industry usage. Thus,
the Court found that "the language of a statute controls when suffi-
ciently clear in its context."' 7'
The Court did turn to the legislative history of section 10(b) to
find any possible support for a contrary position. That history was
not explicit as to congressional intent. In fact, the Court found that
the relevant portions of that history supported the Court's language
analysis. ' 72
In Santa Fe the issue was whether a breach of fiduciary duty,
standing alone, fell within the language of section 10(b).' 73 This
case came soon after Hochfelder, and Justice White followed Justice
Powell's mode of analysis. He looked first to the language of the
statute. He found that the meaning of the terms "manipulative,"
"deceptive," and "contrivance" derived from their common use in
the securities market and in the 1934 Act itself.'74 It was clear in its
context that the use of these terms required some sort of deception
or misrepresentation. Thus, unless such practices accompanied a
breach of fiduciary duty, there could be no violation of section
10(b). The Court so held, as it found no legislative history to the
contrary. 75
Though the Court's primary focus was the statutory language,
167. Id. at 199 (emphasis added). Cf Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d
255, 280 (3d Cir. 1972) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting) ("It seems clear from the
legislative... and the administrative history ... that the element of culpability [must] be
present. This intent was manifested by the constant usage of words such as 'cunning,'
'manipulative,' 'deceptive,' 'fraudulent,'.. . and the absence of language indicating lia-
bility for negligent or non-negligent conduct.").
168. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199 nn. 20-21.
169. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 201 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
172. Id. The Court also examined the interrelations of the provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts and found it incongruous to permit a negligence standard for section 10(b).
Id. at 206-11.
173. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).




the meaning of that language (the way the words in the statute are
used) necessarily required reference to some other source-for ex-
ample, use of the term in the securities markets or in common Eng-
lish. Looking solely at the language of section 10(b), without any
reference beyond a dictionary, one would not find a private right of
action. However, it defies the method of analysis found in Hochfelder
and Santa Fe to discern congressional intent in such a vacuum. As
Justice White stated, the Supreme Court itself has recognized a pri-
vate right of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.' 7 6 The
words in section 10(b) must be read in that context. The Court has
used these words in finding a private remedy, and, therefore, in ju-
dicial practice the words of the statute mean that there is a private
cause of action.
This argument cannot be avoided by labeling this private right
"merely a judicially created action."' 7 7 The Court did not create
the private right; the Court only recognized it. It was Congress that
intended such an action to exist. 178
Therefore one cannot argue that the implied private right of
action under section 10(b) is not literally a provision of the Ex-
change Act. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has
provided this right.' 79 That right is now contained within the words
of section 10(b). It is part of their meaning.' 8 0
This position is supported by the line of Supreme Court cases
ruling that "Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative
or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpreta-
tion when it re-enacts a statute without change ... ."' ' As the
Court recognized, in 1975 Congress made the " 'most substantial
176. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
177. Katsoris, supra note 64, at 301.
178. Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(Tjoflat, J., concurring):
To say that a private cause of action is implied is to say that Congress intended
such an action to exist. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353, 377-78 (1982); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 15-16. It is as if Congress explicitly provided for the cause of action.
(parallel citations omitted).
179. The Court has made clear that the public policy implications behind the securi-
ties laws apply with equal force to express and implied private causes of action. Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985).
180. Further, the sweeping language of the 1934 Act's jurisdictional provision, sec-
tion 27, which gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the Ex-
change Act and all suits brought to enforce any liability or duty created thereunder,
"applies to all actions .. .including implied actions .... Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1036.
181. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) and cases cited therein.
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and significant revision of this country's federal securities laws since
the passage of the Securities Exchange Act in 1934.' ",182 Prior to
this congressional action the "federal courts had consistently and
routinely permitted a [private] plaintiff to proceed under § 10(b)
.... "83 Therefore, "the fact that a comprehensive reexamination
and significant amendment of the [federal securities laws] left intact
the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had implied
a [private] cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively
intended to preserve that remedy."
1 8 4
This examination of Justice White's language analysis eluci-
dates two points. First, section 10(b), containing a private cause of
action, is a provision of the Act; and as a protective provision it is
the kind of substantial right encompassed by the nonwaiver section.
Second, there are serious flaws in making an overly strict language
analysis the sole means of discerning congressional intent in every
action. It must be congressional intention and usage that determine
the context and meaning of statutory language. In addition, as the
Court has made clear, attention must be paid to express decisions of
the Court, acceptance of such decisions by Congress, or pertinent
legislative history. 85 Thus, once given full context, the analysis of
statutory language can look to the actual usage of the specific words
that Congress chose.' 86
The above argument against extension is a subset of the gen-
eral argument that an implied remedy is somehow inferior to an ex-
press remedy. To reiterate the contrary in the present context:
(1) The private right of action under section 10(b) is estab-
lished "beyond peradventure" in the eyes of the Supreme Court. 1
87
(2) In 1975 Congress made major revisions in the Exchange
Act.' 8 8 Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 were left intact. Congress was
surely aware that federal courts had been implying private rights of
182. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1983) (quoting Hear-
ings, supra note 114).
183. Id. at 385.
184. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82
(1982) (emphasis added).
185. Cf Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir. 1972) (Ad-
ams, J., concurring and dissenting) (contending that courts should look to legislative
and administrative history in determining the meaning of language in § 10(b)).
186. Statutory analysis should consist of: (1) a study of the text of the statute; (2) an
examination of legislative and judicial history of the statute; (3) due regard for the pur-
poses underlying the acts. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 523
(9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1986) (No. 86-321).
187. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 380.
188. Id. at 384-85.
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action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. By leaving them intact
Congress has recognized the private right.189
(3) The 1975 amendment included a revision of section 28(b)
of the Exchange Act.' 90 The committee conference report recog-
nized that this change would not affect the application of the Wilko
doctrine.' 9 ' By making this affirmation in an amendment to the
1934 Act, it can be argued that Wilko was meant to extend to the
provisions of that Act, including section 10(b).
(4) The SEC, in adopting rule 15c2-2, recognized the Wilko
doctrine's applicability to all federal securities laws.' 9 2
3. Wilko's "Solicitude"for Section 12(2): The Special Right?-The
Wilko Court found section 12(2) to provide a "special right" because
it shifted the burden of proof normally found at common law.' 93 A
significant parallel is found in Herman & MacClean v. Huddleston.194
In that case the Court held that the preponderance-of-evidence
standard and not the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard was
the standard of proof in a section 10(b) action.' 95 The Court ex-
pressly rejected the lower court's rationale that "the traditional use
of a higher burden of proof in civil fraud actions at common law"
required a higher burden in a section 10(b) action.' 96 Thus, if"spe-
cial right" is defined by a change from the common-law standard of
proof in favor of the plaintiff, then section 10(b) provides a special
right.
The Huddleston Court further stated that "[r]eference to com-
mon law practices can be misleading ... since the historical consid-
erations underlying the imposition of a higher standard of proof
189. Conover, 794 F.2d at 524.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982). See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 116.
192. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. The SEC now contends that a
change in circumstances has rendered securities industry arbitration procedures ade-
quate. The Commission argues that the expansion of its oversight powers under § 19 of
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(s) (1982), ensures such adequacy. The
Commission points out that such oversight and assumed safeguards did not exist at the
time Wilko was decided. See SEC Brief, supra note 31, at 13-21. However, industry arbi-
tration procedures, even under SEC oversight, remain inadequate when viewed against
the congressional standards for protecting investors, as identified in Wilko. See infra text
accompanying note 276.
The Commission strongly agrees with the position that the "colorable argument"
should be rejected. SEC Brief, supra note 31, at 21-26.
193. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
194. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
195. Id. at 390.
196. Id. at 388.
362 [VOL. 46:339
ARBITRABILITY OF SECTION 10(B) CLAIMS
have questionable pertinence here."' 7 This is so because the se-
curities acts go beyond the common law. As the Huddleston Court
stated of the securities acts' antifraud provisions: "Moreover, the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coextensive with
common-law doctrines of fraud. Indeed, an important purpose of
the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in
the available common-law protections by establishing higher stan-
dards of conduct in the securities industry."' 9 8 Thus, it seems fair
to say that all the provisions of the securities acts are special in that
these provisions differ from the common law. If they did not differ,
there would have been no need for Congress to create them.
The view that each protective provision of the securities acts is a
special right can be supported by a careful reading of Wilko and its
discussion of section 12(2). 1 First, the Wilko Court's holding does
not include the special rights language. 2° ° The issue was whether
the Act's nonwaiver provision, section 14, encompassed the right to
select a judicial forum under section 22(a).20 The burden of proof
provided in section 12(2) would not have been waived since its stan-
dards would have also controlled the arbitration.20 2 What in es-
sence was waived was the right to have the section 12(2) claim heard
in a judicial forum.
Further, the "special right" language was prefatory to the
Court's holding.2°3 The term was mentioned only twice, in consec-
utive sentences of a single paragraph. 2°4 This paragraph began the
Court's analysis of the issue it had just raised. The paragraph repre-
sents, in encapsulated form, the entire history and expanse of the
Securities Act: the genesis of the securities laws, their policy, a par-
ticular section, and fine procedural details.
The first sentence recalls President Roosevelt's message to
Congress that sellers of securities must beware of their actions (in
light of the market crash). 20 5 Congress then passed the Securities
197. Id.
198. Id. at 388-89.
199. Under such a reading, Wilko's "solicitude" for section 12(2) would be no differ-
ent from its "solicitude" for any other congressionally-created right in the securities
acts.
200. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953).
201. Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1202 (3d
Cir.), petitionfor cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 25, 1986) (No. 86-487).
202. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433-34.
203. This language is five paragraphs removed from the beginning of the Court's cen-
tral argument. All of these paragraphs can fairly be called prefatory.
204. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
205. Id. at 430.
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Act to protect investors through a policy of full and fair disclo-
sure.20 6 The next line reads, "to effectuate this policy, § 12(2) cre-
ated a special right '....
It is clear that the whole course of events leading to the enact-
ment of the Securities Act did not reach its culminating point in sec-
tion 12(2). In other words, section 12(2) is not the only way "to
effectuate this policy," though the Court's language literally reads
so. Rather, section 12(2) is one aspect of a statutory scheme that
effectuates the policy of investor protection. Section 12(2) is only
exemplary, chosen because it was the protective provision underly-
ing the Wilko plaintiff's claims.
As stated in Huddleston, all the securities acts' remedial provi-
sions are special in the sense that they were newly-created remedies
different from then-available common-law remedies. Wilko said
nothing different. At the end of his central analysis of section 22(a)
and arbitration procedures, Justice Reed wrote: "As the protective
provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise ofjudicial direc-
tion to fairly assure their effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress
must have intended § 14 . . . to apply to the waiver of judicial trial
and review. 2° a It is the "protective provisions" of the Securities
Act, and not only section 12(2), that "require" ajudicial forum. The
protective provisions of the 1934 Act require no less in light of the
above discussions and policy.
4. Exclusive v. Concurrent Jurisdiction.-Finally, the differences
between the jurisdictional statutes, section 22(a) of the Securities
Act and section 27 of the Exchange Act, will be considered. The
chief distinction raised in the colorable argument was the exclusivity
of federal jurisdiction. Why the narrowing of jurisdiction was con-
sidered so important that it permits waiver of the federal forum has
never been adequately explained. The loss of a judicial forum to an
arbitral, which the Wilko Court considered insufficient to effectuate
the protective provisions, occurs in both circumstances.
The only apparent argument for exclusive jurisdiction's making
waiver more appropriate is that the "narrowing" of the forum
manifests less of a congressional intent to effectuate the protective
provisions of the 1934 Act. This is highly unlikely.2 0 9 In fact a con-
trary reading seems at least equally appropriate. The Ninth Circuit
206. Id. at 431.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 437.
209. See supra note 154.
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found the distinction between concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction
"an even more forceful indication of Congress' intent that federal
courts oversee the interpretation and application of the 1934
Act." 210 Additionally, one commentator has suggested "that the ex-
clusive jurisdiction granted to the federal courts by section 27 of the
Exchange Act amounts to the creation of a 'special right' which is at
least as important as the special right referred to in Wilko." 2 1 ' Both
statements emphasize the position that Congress intended its grant
of exclusive federal jurisdiction to provide greater protection than
concurrent jurisdiction provided.
It may be further argued that Congress provided exclusive ju-
risdiction to create a uniquely federal right.212 Such rights are best
suited to development and interpretation in federal courts in which
the judiciary has a greater expertise in the substantive area of the
law.21" Further, the need for uniformity and predictability in appli-
cation of the statutes is best met by allowing development of this
case law solely in the federal forum.21 4 This is especially true when,
as with the securities acts, the language of the statute is expansive
and the latitude for judicial interpretation is wide.21 5
210. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1986) (No. 86-321). The Eleventh Circuit in
Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) consid-
ered the loss of the exclusive forum as a concern of "nearly equal force" to the loss of
both state and federal forums. This was so because the 1934 Act "permit[s] a plaintiff to
obtain a federal forum without having to meet the requirements of diversity jurisdic-
tion-something which, for one reason or another, plaintiffs often find advantageous."
Id.
211. Gruenbaum, supra note 79, at 59 (emphasis in original). The author states that
"[i]ndeed, Congress' vesting exclusive jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims in the fed-
eral courts would seem to make the right created thereby more 'special' than the right
created by the concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction provided for in the Securi-
ties Act." Id.
212. The First Circuit has argued that because Congress did not expressly create a
private section 10(b) action, private plaintiffs are not covered by the 1934 Act's jurisdic-
tional provisions. Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d
291, 297 (1st Cir. 1986). The court contended that "[hiad Congress regarded an exclu-
sive federal court forum as so critical, it would have been simple for Congress to pro-
vide, as it did in the 1933 Act, that individuals be able to bring a cause of action in that
forum." Id. However, this argument would be no different from contending that there
should be no private right of action under section 10(b) because if Congress had in-
tended such a right, "it would have been simple enough for Congress to provide it."
The Supreme Court has taken a different approach to ascertaining congressional intent.
See supra Section III.B.2.
213. Muench & Redish, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 311, 330 (1976).
214. Id. at 331.
215. Id.
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Thus, it is not self-evident that exclusive jurisdiction is a re-
stricting factor. Without an explanation as to why section 27 is re-
strictive with regard to investors' rights, there is no principled
reason to use Congress' provision of exclusive jurisdiction as a ra-
tionale for minimizing the right to a judicial forum.
In sum, the distinctions between the two securities acts do not
provide an analytic basis to ignore their bond of common policy. In
light of Wilko, the private remedial provisions of both acts are wor-
thy of the protections provided by their identical nonwaiver sec-
tions. However, the Wilko rationale itself has been brought into
question by those who contend that arbitration is a sufficient and
practical way to protect investors. Before addressing the strength of
this argument, the matter of equal bargaining position will be faced.
IV. DISPUTES BETWEEN BROKERS AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
OR SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS
A. Overview
When the fraud claim against a broker is brought by an institu-
tional investor or by a sophisticated individual investor, the question
of equal bargaining position becomes relevant. The Wilko Court
stated that Congress' purpose in enacting the antiwaiver provisions
was to assure that sellers could not manuever buyers in such a way
as to weaken the protections afforded buyers under the Securities
Act. 2t 6 Furthermore, Justice Reed found that " [w]hile a buyer and
seller of securities, under some circumstances, may deal at arm's
length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was drafted
with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor.""1 7
Such disadvantages occurred because "dealers in securities have
better opportunities to investigate and appraise the prospective
earnings and business plans affecting securities than the buyer. 218
In Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.219 the
Seventh Circuit found the bargaining posture of the parties to be a
consideration "at play" in Wilko and Scherk.220 Earlier in its opinion,
the court stated that "[i]t is clear that the Securities Acts were
216. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953).
217. Id. at 435.
218. Id.
219. 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
220. Id. at 835. In fact, the Scherk majority expressly stated it was not addressing the
issue of disparity in bargaining position. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
512-13 n.6 (1974). Cf. Comment, Securities Law: Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 17
WASHBURN L.J. 680, 688-89 (1978) (arguing that although Scherk did not address itself to
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passed with an eye to the disadvantages confronting the small inves-
tor in [the] area. "221 Further developing this position, the court
adopted Justice, then Judge, Stevens' analysis of Wilko (taken from
his dissent in the circuit court's Scherk decision) that Wilko's protec-
tions were aimed only at " 'the relatively uninformed individual in-
vestor.' "222 Thus, the Weissbuch court found that "where both
parties possessed formidable financial interests and where their ar-
bitration agreement emerged from a period of prolonged and ex-
tensive negotiations .. . [t]he waiver of a statutory remedy in the
courts could be realistically perceived as the product of a bar-
gain."'223 This position has been accepted by a number of commen-
tators,2 24 and was most recently adopted in the Ninth Circuit.
225
The central position of the Weissbuch argument, that the securi-
ties acts were created only to protect small investors as such, was
strenuously rejected by Justice Douglas in his Scherk dissent. 226 He
stated that the Securities Act "does not speak in terms of 'sophisti-
cated' as opposed to 'unsophisticated' people dealing in securities.
The rules when the giants play are the same as when the pygmies
enter the market.
2 2 7
In Justice Douglas' analysis, the giants receive the same protec-
tions as the small investors not for themselves, but because the acts
of the giants have immediate impact on their individual small inves-
tors. Thus, in Scherk Alberto-Culver was not the victim of the al-
leged fraud: "the thousands of investors who are the security
the "disparity of bargaining power" question, the Weissbuch decision gives the disparity
issue new life).
221. Weissbuch, 558 F.2d at 834.
222. Id. at 835 (quoting Alberto-Culver v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 1973)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
223. Id.
224. Katsoris, supra note 64, at 295 n.115; Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved
Problem of Predispute Arbitration Agreements for Pendent Claims, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 693, 703
n.58 (1980); Note, supra note 22, at 539-40. These commentators tend to cite a few
decisions by the lower federal courts as well as decisions involving transactions between
members of the securities industry. These later cases are now governed by § 28(b) of the
1934 Act. The analogy to transactions between industry insiders and outsiders may fal-
ter when the kind of knowledge attributable to insiders has to be assumed of investors.
225. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1986) (No. 86-321).
226. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526-28 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
227. Id. at 526. " 'To decide issues of law on the size of the person who gets advan-
tage or claims disadvantage is treacherous.' " Gruenbaum, supra note 79, at 62 (quoting
Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 753 (1947)). This argument is not
effective if, as Weissbuch contends, the law does not initially apply to large investors.
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holders in Alberto-Culver" were the victims of that fraud.228 Justice
Douglas argued that institutional investors "cannot waive those stat-
utory [protections], for our corporate giants are not principalities of
power but guardians of a host of wards unable to care for them-
selves. It is these wards that the 1934 Act tries to protect. "229
Justice Douglas' dissent rests on the same premise as Justice
Stevens' dissent-that Congress passed the 1934 Act to protect the
small investor. However, in Justice Douglas' view this requires that
large institutional investors receive all of the Act's protections, since
these investors are merely embodiments of the thousands of smaller
investors entitled to such protection. This should be so whether the
institutional investor likes it or not.2 30 Read in any light, Justice
Douglas' analysis does not explain why large or sophisticated indi-
vidual investors, acting solely on their own account, should receive
the same protections as small or institutional investors.
B. Application of the Securities Acts to All Investors
The Supreme Court, in granting certiorari to hear McMahon v.
231Shearson/American Express, Inc., may choose to face the questions
presented by both the sophisticated individual investor and the in-
stitutional investor.23 2 Assuming for purposes of argument that the
McMahons were sophisticated investors,23 3 there may yet be a rea-
228. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 526 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 527.
230. However, the direct maneuvering of the small investor here is not by the broker,
but by corporate management. The prudence of corporate actions and investments may
be better addressed under the laws regarding fiduciary duty and whether or not an
agreement to arbitrate was a failure in business judgment. In light of the Supreme
Court's position since Scherk, imposing on management a per se rule against arbitration
may be perceived as an intrusion of federal law into the sphere of state law. See, e.g.,
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977).
231. 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
232. The McMahons invested "individually and as trustees for various pension and
profit sharing plans .... " Id. at 95.
233. What makes an individual investor sophisticated in these circumstances will de-
pend on the Court's ruling. If the Court holds that the provisions of the securities acts
apply to all investors, then a definition is unnecessary. However, if the Court holds that
equal bargaining position permits arbitration, then what will put an individual on equal
terms becomes an issue. Is it merely a matter of wealth or investment size? Must the
investor have actual knowledge equivalent to the broker's? Must the investor have a
sophisticated advisor?
Though the McMahons apparently made sizeable investments both personally and
as trustees, they were not personally sophisticated traders. Brief for Respondent at 2-3,
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986). How-
ever, under SEC rule 215 and other sections, the Commission may consider an investor
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son for the Court to provide them the full protection of the securi-
ties acts. Such a rationale is based on the premise that the securities
acts protect investors not only directly, but also through protecting
the integrity of the marketplace. As the Court recently made clear
in Randall v. Loftsgaarden,2 s4 the 1934 Act is "not confined solely to
compensating defrauded investors .... Congress [also] intended to
deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities markets, and
to ensure full disclosure of information material to investment
decisions."'235
The Exchange Act, as an extension to the 1933 Act, was aimed
at transactions conducted on the securities exchanges and over-the
counter markets.23 6 Congress enacted the 1934 Act to deal with
"transactions in securities [that] ... are affected with a national pub-
lic interest. '23 7 These regulations were designed to, "[among other
things], perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for se-
curities . . . in order to protect interstate commerce, the national
credit, the Federal taxing power.., and to insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets in such transactions .... ,"'28 Thus, if the antiwaiver
provisions of the securities acts are necessary in all cases to assure
the maintenance of "fair and honest markets," neither the sophisti-
cated individual investor nor the large institutional investor should
be permitted to ignore those provisions.239
accredited when that investor's net worth exceeds $1,000,000 at the time of the
purchase, or when the investor's income has been greater than $200,000 in the two
years prior to the purchase and greater than $200,000 in the year of purchase. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.215 (1986). These rules for accredited investors are especially important in deter-
mining the disclosure requirements for securities issues in limited offerings. T. HAZEN,
THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 4.13-4.20 (Lawyer's ed. 1985). However, in
light of the strong policy statements made in Wilko, and the heavy responsibilities placed
on brokers to deal fairly, id. at § 10.6, it would be incongruous to call the McMahons
sophisticated for present purposes.
234. 106 S. Ct. 3143, 3154 (1986).
235. Id. (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
236. Note, supra note 22, at 533.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982).
238. Id. (emphasis added).
239. The Wilko Court stated that "[w]hile a buyer and seller of securities, under some
circumstances, may deal at arm's length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act
was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor." Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953). The Court did not draw any express conclusions about how
"arm's length [transactions] on equal terms" were to be dealt with. It is possible to read
this statement as standing for the proposition that all buyer-seller transactions in securi-
ties will be subject to the Act's protections because of a general overriding concern for
investor protection.
This author's view is that all transactions should be protected only if such protec-
tions secure the integrity of the marketplace. In this way the full protection necessary
for the small investor, and the nation's economic health, would be assured.
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Under this view, the integrity of the market may be threatened
if the larger disputes are no longer subject to the scrutiny of the
federal judiciary. Without the fear of the remedies available in fed-
eral court and the stigma attached to being brought into court, bro-
kers and dealers may fail to restrain their actions with sufficient
rigor.240 Such an attitude in relation to large investors would affect
the market as a whole and reach all investors. Thus, no investor,
even if personally sophisticated, can be allowed to bargain away the
protections afforded to other investors.
V. Do CHANGES IN ARBITRATION PRACTICES AND QUALITY
MANDATE THE RESCISSION OF WILKO?
Changes in the arbitration procedures within the securities in-
dustry, improvement in the quality of arbitrators, and a recent
group of Supreme Court cases renewing the emphasis placed on the
Federal Arbitration Act24 ' are the basis for industry 42 and commen-
tator 2 4  assertions that the Wilko doctrine may no longer be via-
ble.244  The argument appears to be twofold: (1) improved
240. Though there may be a price to pay in arbitration, and some stigma from losing
an award, the effect of an arbitral is not the same as that of an adjudication. The brokers
argue that they seek arbitration not because it favors them, but because it is a fair and
efficient process for all concerned. The independence, thoroughness, and efficiency of
the securities industry's arbitration procedures, however, remain in question. See, e.g.,
Katsoris, supra note 64, at 309-14; Note, Federal and State Securities Claims: Litigation or
Arbitration?-Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985), 61 WASH. L. REV.
245, 259-61 (1986). See also infra note 270.
241. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346
(1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
242. See Note, supra note 22, at 550-51 & n.183 (citing Arieff, SEC Criticized on Arbitra-
tion, Legal Times, Aug. 1, 1983, at 5, col. 1).
243. See, e.g., Katsoris, supra note 64, at 298-301; Krause, supra note 224, at 720-21.
244. The First and Eighth Circuits take the position that the passage of the Arbitra-
tion Act, along with recent Supreme Court decisions permitting arbitration of certain
kinds of claims, create a presumption that arbitration is procedurally adequate. Page v.
Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 297 (1st Cir. 1986)
("[W]e reject the proposition that, after Mitsubishi, courts can consider the alleged inef-
fectiveness of the arbitral forum in deciding the arbitrability of a federal statutory
right."); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1398
n.16 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 86-578)
("Congress, through the Arbitration Act, as well as the Supreme Court have expressed
increased approval for the use of arbitration rather than adjudication.") To say that
competent arbitrators fairly apply an arbitral's procedural rules, however, is not
equivalent to saying that those procedures meet the protective standards demanded by
the securities acts. The congressional provisions for investor protection and the Wilko
rule that developed out of Congress' mandate have never been set aside by either Con-
gress or the Court. These circuit courts are simply wrong to presume such a change.
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arbitration procedures increase investor protection, thus decreasing
the policy concerns behind the securities acts, which (2) permits
greater attention to be paid to the policy behind the arbitration acts,
at a time when that policy is being actively promoted by the Court.
A. Nonwaiver Provisions Are Not Subject to Policy Balancing
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. 2 45 the
Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, gave instruction on in-
terpreting the Federal Arbitration Act:
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to con-
strue the scope of arbitration agreements covered by that
Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other statute
on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to
which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable.246
Thus, the courts' inquiries regarding the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements must center on the issue of whether "Congress in-
tended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute [other
than the Arbitration Act] to include protection against waiver of the
right to a judicial forum . . . . [T]hat intention will be deducible
from text or legislative history" of the other statute.24 7
This is not a balancing test. The Court "must rely" on the con-
gressional intent and policy behind the statutes that prohibit waiver
of a judicial forum.24 8 The policies underlying arbitration only be-
come relevant insofar as the policy behind the federal statute at is-
sue-here, the Securities Act or the Exchange Act-recognizes that
arbitration policy.249
245. 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
246. Id. at 3355 (emphasis added).
247. Id. (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
248. Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1202 (3d
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 25, 1986) (No. 86-487). The
Third Circuit also stated that "Wilko did not involve interpretations of arbitration agree-
ments; rather [it] involved interpretations of federal statutes that prohibit the applica-
tion of forum-selection clauses." Id.
249. Some courts contend that Mitsubishi requires that the policies behind the Arbitra-
tion Act be weighed equally with those of other federal statutes (e.g., the securities laws).
See, e.g., Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 297 (1st
Cir. 1986) (Arbitration Act should receive equal deference). Mitsubishi never stated such
a rule. The Mitsubishi Court only instructed courts to look at the congressional intent in
the statute at issue to determine if Congress permitted waiver of a judicial forum. Mit-
subishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355. As the Court understood, two statutes are not wholly equal
simply because Congress created them both.
This point is plainly made by comparing the history and policy of the Arbitration
Act with that of the securities acts. In 1925, the Arbitration Act was passed to ease the
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The Mitsubishi Court cited Wilko as an example of how courts
should carry out this inquiry. 2 0 In Wilko itself, the Court began its
concluding paragraph by stating that "[t]wo policies, not easily rec-
oncilable, are involved in this case." '25 ' At first glance it appears
that the Court engaged in a balancing of the two policies. However,
a review of the Court's preceding analysis demonstrates the
contrary.
In stating the issue, the Wilko Court had asked whether an
"agreement to arbitrate a future controversy [was] a 'condition, stip-
ulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision' of the Securities Act which
§ 14 declares 'void.' -252 This framing of the issue subordinated ar-
bitration to the question of nonwaiver. Further, Justice Reed gave
only a paragraph of prefatory discussion to the general purposes of
the Arbitration Act. 255  All of the Court's hard analysis centered
around the requirements of the Securities Act.254 And the Court's
decision rests wholly on that analysis.
Justice Reed removed any doubts about policy balancing in the
final sentence of his opinion:
burdens of time and expense on parties and the courts. See supra Section II.A.2. (Argua-
bly, it provides brokers and dealers with other advantages as well. See infra note 270.)
After the great market crash of 1929, Congress passed the securities acts to protect
investors against unfair practices. See supra Section II.A.1. But the two securities acts
were not only designed to protect investors. By attempting to guarantee a fair market-
place, Congress was working to repair the fallen economic health and security of the
nation. See supra Section IV.B. Thus, while the absence of arbitration in certain situa-
tions may add a burden of time and expense to investors, brokers, and the courts, the
failure to arbitrate securities claims will neither bring down the federal courts nor bank-
rupt investors. In sharp contrast, the absence of the securities laws' protections would
pose a threat to millions of individual investors and to the nation's economy as a whole.
This threat to investors and the nation is real. "The cases litigated number in the
thousands every year." Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 3 (1986) (footnote omitted). Churning, insider trading, and the entire range of
securities violations still exist, and unfortunately on no small scale (as, e.g., the Winans,
Levine, and Boesky cases highlight). Thus, the protection of the securities acts remains a
necessity. If arbitration can meet the congressional standards of protection required by
the securities acts, it should be considered. Otherwise, the policy behind arbitration
cannot be allowed to dilute those standards.
The good life of the "Roaring Twenties" had to give way to the necessities of the
crash. Equally, the Arbitration Act of 1925, with its desire for speed and inexpensive
solutions, must give way to policies that are aimed at conserving the fundamental eco-
nomic well-being of the nation. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
250. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
251. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
252. Id. at 430.
253. Id. at 431-32.
254. Id. at 434-38. See supra Section II.B.
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Recognizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbi-
tration may provide for the solution of commercial contro-
versies, we decide that the intention of Congress concerning the
sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Act.2 5
It is this concern with the underlying policy of the Securities Act that
is the definitive consideration. Under both Mitsubishi and Wilko the
same deference must be given to the Exchange Act. Since the con-
siderations for prohibiting waiver of the judicial forum are funda-
mentally identical in both acts, arbitration agreements are best held
invalid when an investor brings a section 10(b) claim.
B. Changes in the Procedure, Quality of Arbitrators, and Fairness
In Wilko the Court held that Congress intended to protect in-
vestors through the provision of a judicial forum. The intention of
Congress cannot have changed. The policy behind the Arbitration
Act cannot be used to counterbalance this intent to provide a judi-
cial forum. However, it may be possible to restate in functional
terms Congress' intention to provide a judicial forum. Thus, the
proposition that arbitration is functionally equivalent to adjudica-
tion in a judicial forum becomes the only viable argument against
application of the nonwaiver provision.
The Uniform Code of Arbitration.-In 1976 the SEC solicited com-
ment regarding development of a uniform system of dispute resolu-
tion procedures for small claims.256 This initiated a dialogue that
ultimately lead to a number of self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
forming the Securities Industry Conference of Arbitration
(SICA).2 5 7 SICA "developed [the] comprehensive Uniform Code of
Arbitration . . . for the securities industry. '2, 8 The Code was
adopted by participating SROs in 1979 and 1980.259 The Code's
procedures apply uniformly to all claims, with some exceptions for
small claims under $2,500.26o
255. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438 (emphasis added).
256. Settling Disputes Between Customers and Registered Brokers and Dealers, Se-
curities Exchange Act Release No. 12,528 (June 9, 1976), reprinted in 9 S.E.C. Docket
833-35 (Mar.-July 1976).
257. Katsoris, supra note 64, at 283.
258. Id. at 284.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 285, 289. The UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION (Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration 1979) was adopted without change by the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) in 1979. This Code embodies the following rules (citations
are to NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, N.A.S.D. Manual (CCH) 3701-3743):
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The Code provides that a majority of the arbitration panel must
not be part of the securities industry.2 6' No clear guidance is given
in the Code as to who qualifies to be "public arbitrators, 262 that is,
those arbitrators who are to constitute a majority of the panel. Nor,
for that matter, is there quality guidance for industry arbitrators.263
One court has stated that "the arbitrators available to consider dis-
putes are generally knowledgeable individuals who have had experi-
ence working with the federal securities laws."'2 64 However, even if
these persons are as qualified as federal judges, questions of impar-
(1) There is a six-year time period from the occurrence of the event at issue to
raise the claim. 3715.
(2) The SRO appoints a panel of three to five impartial arbitrators-a majority of
whom cannot be from the securities industry (though the public customer may request
such a majority). 3719.
(3) The Director of Arbitration of the SRO determines who serves on the panel,
and who acts as chairperson. 3720.
(4) The parties must be informed of the affiliations of the panel before a hearing
date is fixed. 3723.
(5) Each party gets one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause.
3722.
(6) The arbitrators have a duty to disclose any ground that may prevent objectiv-
ity. 3723.
(7) Wide latitude is given as to materiality, relevance, and admissibility of evi-
dence. 3734.
(8) Parties have a right at any time to representation by counsel. 3727.
(9) Subpoena power exists as provided by law, but parties are encouraged to co-
operate and produce requested data without resort to subpoena. 3732.
(10) Arbitrators can compel members of the SRO to appear and produce records.
3733.
(11) Parties shall cooperate voluntarily in exchanging records. 3732(b).
(12) The Code sets out provisions for pleadings requiring- (a) a "Statement
of Claim" specifying relevant facts and remedies sought, 3713(b);
(b) twenty days to answer, 3713(d);
(c) that the answer be specific in setting forth all available defenses,
3713(d).
261. See supra note 260.
262. Katsoris, supra note 64, at 310.
263. There has historically been a problem with the individual investor's viewing the
arbitral as inherently unfair because those who sit on the panel are either in the industry
or closely affiliated. Id. at 309-12. The Code has added rules to guard against those who
are essentially industry members being classified as public arbitrators. Id. However, to
investors who consider themselves members of the "public," the Code's use of the term
"public" may seem narrow, and questions of inherent bias may arise. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 240, at 260 (remarking that attorneys who represent securities brokers are
often selected as "public" arbitrators).
264. Brener v. Becker Paribus, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The
court also noted that "[t]he American Arbitration Association maintains a list of arbitra-
tors who have been selected for their knowledge and expertise." Id. at 448 n.9. Most
SROs presently keep their own list of arbitrators. Katsoris, supra note 64, at 312 n.258.
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265tiality and meaningful public participation still remain.
Assuming that the Code is an improvement and arbitrators are
qualified and "generally knowledgeable," the important procedural
differences between arbitration and adjudication adduced in Wilko
remain. Accountability of the arbitral through a formal record and
review is still not required. 66 The SROs often choose to keep
"some sort of record, ' 267 but there seems to be no system of opin-
ions. The scope of judicial review and vacation of award is still lim-
ited to egregious behavior.268 Thus, as long as there is a full and
fair hearing and the arbitrators are honest, there will be no substan-
tive review. 2 69 A SICA proposal to broaden the scope of review was
"rejected as inimical to the simplicity and brevity of arbitration pro-
cedures. 2 70 Without a record or review there is no way to assure
that the protective provisions crafted by Congress are being prop-
erly applied.27 '
Other procedural disadvantages for investors assigned to arbi-
trals remain. The wide choice of venue provisions remains lost in
272arbitration. Investors can choose which SRO to arbitrate before,
but they are subject to that SRO's choice of locale for arbitration.273Nor is the extensive pretrial discovery provided by the courts avail-
able in arbitration. 2 71 "This is true 'even though the lack of discov-
ery may be fatal to a party's case.' "275
Thus, Congress' guarantee of investor protection still cannot be
assured to the extent the Wilko Court envisioned. There are no ap-
pellate arbitrators (competent or not) to review interpretations of
265. Katsoris, supra note 64, at 309-13.
266. Id. at 286.
267. Id. at 286 n.47.
268. Id. at 290-91.
269. Id. at 290 (citing Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854)).
270. Id. at 291. It is also noteworthy that the investor gives up the right to a jury trial
in a federal forum by submitting claims to arbitration. Note, supra note 240, at 255.
Further, brokers may seek arbitration to avoid more liberal jury awards. Note, supra
note 22, at 551 n.180.
271. In Wilko the Court found that the provisions of the Securities Act would control
arbitration even if the agreement to arbitrate did not require that the arbitrators follow
that law. 346 U.S. 427, 434 (1953). Cf. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3353-55 (1985) (arbitration clause need not expressly
mention statute for statutory rights to be arbitrated, with arbitral applying substantive
rights afforded by the statute at issue).
272. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa (1982).
273. Note, supra note 240, at 255.
274. Katsoris, supra note 64, at 287 & n.52.
275. Id. at 287 n.52 (quoting G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION 40 (2d ed. 1983)).
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law. Moreover, the absence of wide-ranging venue and discovery
procedures makes the arbitral less advantageous to the investor.
The SEC's oversight of industry arbitration procedures has not
cured these fundamental flaws adduced in Wilko.2 76
The arbitration process as it now exists simply does not meet
the standards of the type of forum intended by Congress to assure
the effectiveness of the securities acts' remedial provisions.277
Thirty-three years ago the Wilko Court specifically brought out that
English law did provide for "judicial determination of legal issues"
decided in an arbitral.278 It may be that the Court was indicating
that a sufficient arbitration process, which would include a thorough
review, might meet the requirements of investor protection under
the Securities Act's jurisdictional provisions. Yet the securities in-
dustry rejected the SICA proposals to broaden the scope of review
as inimical to the arbitration process. 279
If the securities industry truly wants the repeal of Wilko, it will
have to provide the assurances of investor protection that Congress
requires under the jurisdictional provisions of the securities acts.
That the provision of such assurances runs counter to the efficiency
policy behind the Arbitration Act is irrelevant. Mitsubishi requires
only that when determining the arbitrability of securities law claims,
the courts look to Congress' intent in creating the securities
statutes.
The securities laws are demanding. They do create inconven-
ience. Yet they have a weighty purpose, born of the need to protect
the financial health of millions of individuals and the nation. Cries
of inefficiency and inconvenience, or assertions that the arbitration
process is close enough or fair enough, should not induce courts to
give up the principles Congress established in the securities acts. It
is the securities industry that must live up to those principles and
develop suitable procedures. It was the failure of the securities in-
dustry that originally led to the creation of the securities acts. As
the Wilko Court reiterated, "let the seller also beware"-and be
responsible. 280
276. See SEC Brief, supra note 31.
277. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
278. Id. at 437.
279. Katsoris, supra note 64, at 291.
280. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1933)).
After four years of warnings about the unrestricted use of arbitration clauses, the SEC,
in May of 1983, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking calling for broker-dealers to
provide information on the judicial alternatives under the federal securities laws. "The
securities industry severely criticized the proposed rule" and raised the charge that the
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VI. CONCLUSION
A careful reading of Wilko, coupled with a thorough analysis of
the relevant provisions of the two securities acts, requires that the
Wilko doctrine be extended to section 10(b) claims. Moreover, a re-
examination of the arbitration process in light of Wilko and Mitsub-
ishi reveals that the arbitration process has not changed sufficiently
to meet the demands of investor protection. Thus, the Court
should expressly recognize that the Wilko rationale encompasses
section 10(b) claims. Any policy re-evaluation that would overturn
Wilko must be left to Congress.
LEE APPLEBAUM*
Commission was not serious about arbitration. "Despite the industry's objections, the
SEC adopted the rule ... noting that informal warnings had failed to curtail the securi-
ties industry's use of deceptive arbitration clauses." Note, supra note 22, at 550-52.
The adoption of rule 15c2-2 promoted the congressional policy of investor protec-
tion by bolstering the effect of both securities acts' nonwaiver provisions. This sort of
action "assure[s] that sellers [can]not maneuver buyers into a position that might
weaken their ability to recover under the [securities acts]." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432. The
recent industry practices that mandated SEC action in adopting the rule reiterate the
inherent "disadvantages under which buyers labor," and the inherent power imbalance
tilted in favor of the industry. Id. at 435.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Marc Steinberg and the students of his
Securities Regulation Seminar for their comments and suggestions, and Mrs. Jaci Fried-
lander and Mrs. Eileen Gretes for their help in preparing the manuscript for this
comment.
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